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Abstract
We provide a theoretical microfoundation for the negative relationship between firing costs
and labor market tightness and its effects on labor market performance. The optimal level of
firing costs is chosen by the employed worker -- i.e. the insider -- by maximizing her human
capital. Performing a comparative statics exercise, we analyze the effects of labor market
tightness on the optimal choice of firing costs. The results are clear cut and allow to obtain a
decreasing firing costs function in the labor market tightness. Moreover, we show that this
negative relationship can give rise to a labor market configuration characterized by multiple
equilibria: prolonged average duration of unemployment will produce a labor market with
low flows and high strictness of employment protection, and vice versa.
We thank participants at seminars at the University of Padua, the Working Lunch in Labor Economics (Rome), the EALE
Conference 2006 (Prague) and the IZA - World Bank Conference on Employment and Development (Boon) as well as Paolo
Naticchioni, Christopher Pissarides, Pietro Reichlin, Giorgio Rodano, Antonio Scialà and Clifford Wymer for helpful comments
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Citation: Tilli, Riccardo and Enrico Saltari, (2008) "Do labor market conditions affect the strictness of employment protection
legislation?." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 4 pp. 1-9
Submitted: February 20, 2008.  Accepted: March 13, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume10/EB-08J60003A.pdf1 Introduction
The “state of the art” of economic theory about the eﬀects of employment
protection legislation (EPL) on labor market performance does not seem to
be of much help for policy makers. We see an ample literature producing a
variety of results, not always with clear-cut conclusions.
A wide empirical evidence (Donohue and Siegelman (1995), Berger (1997),
Ichino, Polo, and Rettore (2003) and Marinescu (2005)) suggests that labor
market rigidity is related to the level of economic activity. When the economy
is on a downturn and labor market conditions are getting worse, employed
workers reckon that the probability of being hired if ﬁred will be lower. In
such a case they will resist any attempt to ﬁre them.
The aim of this paper is to look for a negative relation between labor
market conditions and the strictness of EPL.T om a k et h i sr e l a t i o n s h i pe n -
dogenous, we build a model where the employed worker (the insider) chooses
the optimal level of ﬁring costs by maximizing her human capital. Our theo-
retical model shows the existence of an inverse relation between labor market
conditions and the level of ﬁring cost under plausible hypothesis.
Moreover, diﬀerent structures of the labor market may give rise to multi-
ple equilibria: high average duration of unemployment will produce a labor
market with low ﬂows and strict employment protection. Vice versa, a short
duration of the unemployment status will produce high ﬂows and low levels
of ﬁring costs.1
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the labor market.
Section 3 illustrates the insider optimal choice of ﬁring cost and the derivation
of the ﬁring cost as a function of labor market tightness. Once derived the
j o bc r e a t i o nw i t he n d o g e n o u sﬁring costs in section 4, we show in the next
section how multiple equilibria can arise. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2T h e l a b o r m a r k e t
The economy is made up of a continuum of risk-neutral workers and ﬁrms,
which consume all of their income and discount the future at a constant
interest rate r. Labor force is given by assumption. Any of the workers may
be employed or unemployed. When employed, a worker receives a wage w
which we assume to be exogenously given.2 When unemployed, she enjoys
1The latter ﬁnding can be seen as providing a microfoundation for the result obtained
in Saltari and Tilli (2004).
2This may reﬂect the characteristics of the European labor markets, where wages show
marked elements of rigidity or are completely ﬁxed through collective bargaining for a
1leisure b.E v e r y ﬁrm in the market has a job that may be either ﬁlled or
vacant. If it is ﬁlled, the economic activity yields a product y.I ft h ej o bi s
vacant, the ﬁrm incurs cost c for its maintenance.
Unemployed workers and vacancies randomly match according to a Pois-
son process. The matching function is: h = h(u,v) where h denotes the ﬂow
of new matches, u i st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n dv is the vacancy rate. It is
assumed to be increasing and concave in each argument and to have constant
return to scale overall.
The average rate at which vacancies meet potential partners is m(θ)=
h(u,v)





> 0) is the probability for an unemployed worker to
ﬁnd a job. θ is the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers and will be
interpreted as a convenient measure of the labor market tightness.
We characterize the EPL as a cost F o nj o bd e s t r u c t i o nw h i c ha ﬀects the
ﬂows in and out of unemployment. Thus, we do not consider the existence
of severance payments. An idiosyncratic shock hits the single ﬁrm at rate s.
In order to capture the eﬀects of ﬁring costs on hirings and layoﬀs, we
assume that θm(θ),i sa ﬀected in a multiplicative way by a function φ(F),
decreasing and convex in F. Similarly, since ﬁring costs also aﬀect layoﬀs,
we assume that the separation rate is a decreasing function of F, s(F),a l s o
decreasing and convex in F.3
The dynamics of unemployment is given by the diﬀerence between inﬂows
and outﬂows: ˙ u = s(F)(1− u) − φ(F)θm(θ)u. The steady state value of
the unemployment rate (the Beveridge curve) is
s(F)
s(F)+φ(F)θm(θ), showing the
dependence of the unemployment rate on the equilibrium values of F and θ.
Consider the “asset value” E and U of being an employed or unemployed
worker, respectively. These are deﬁned by the following equations:
rE = w − s(F)(E − U) (1)
rU = b + φ(F)θm(θ)(E − U) (2)
As for the ﬁrm, when it posts a new vacancy, the following equation must
be satisﬁed:
rV = −c + φ(F)m(θ)(J − V ) (3)
number of years. For a recent theoretical justiﬁcation of wage stickiness, see Hall (2005).
3The assumptions on the second derivative of φ(F) and s(F) are consistent with the
empirical evidence. See Boeri, Ruiz, and Galasso (2003).
2where V is the value of a vacant job.
In turn, the value of a ﬁlled job J satisﬁes:
rJ = y − w − s(F)(J + F − V ) (4)
3 The insider problem and the relationship
between ﬁring costs and labor tightness
The choice of the employed worker is made with the objective to maximize
the proﬁle of her intertemporal consumption with respect to F,t h a ti st o
maximize E.









is the proportion of time a worker will spend unemployed during her lifetime
when currently employed.
Let us now study the relationship between ﬁring costs and labor tightness.
From the ﬁrst order condition for problem (5) the optimal level of ﬁring
cost, say F∗,is implicitly deﬁned by:
s
0 (F)[r + φ(F)θm(θ)] = s(F)φ
0 (F)θm(θ) (6)







Thus, to show that there is negative relationship between the optimal
level of ﬁring costs and the labor market tightness, we have to show that the
two derivatives αθF and αFF h a v et h es a m es i g n .
Writing out the two derivatives, we get:
αFF (θ,F)=
s00 (F)[r + φ(F)θm(θ)]
[r + s(F)+φ(F)θm(θ)]
2 > 0 (7)
which is positive by the convexity of s(F). Moreover, the cross derivative:
αFθ(θ,F)=[ θm
0 (θ)+m(θ)]




3is positive. This is because the numerator is positive.
To see this, rewrite the ﬁrst order condition as follows:
s
0 (F)φ(F)θm(θ) − s(F)φ
0 (F)θm(θ)=−s
0 (F)r>0
which is positive since s0 (F) < 0.T h i si m p l i e st h a t :
s
0 (F)φ(F) − s(F)φ
0 (F) < 0
is positive.
Using this result in (8), we see that αFθ(θ,F) is positive. In turn, this
implies a decreasing relation between θ and F.
To put it in words: Suppose ﬁring costs are at the optimum and that labor
market tightness increases. As a consequence the unemployment duration
increases too because we have just seen that αFθ > 0. T or e t u r nt ot h e
optimum, F must decrease (since αFF (θ,F) > 0).
Let us see a simple example. Assume that: a) t h ee x i tr a t ei sθm(θ)=θ
γ
(a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function); b) the hiring
rate is φ(F)=1−F; c) the separation rate is s(F)= λ
1+F, with λ is positive
but less than unity.
These functional forms can be justiﬁed as follows. First, assume that
the ﬁring cost F is normalized to be in the unit range, F ∈ [0,1].W h e n
F =0 , the labor market is fully “ﬂexible”; if instead F =1 , the labor
market is “rigid”. This is because when the ﬁring cost is equal to unity,
the hiring rate is φ(1)θm(θ)=0 , while in contrast full ﬂexibility implies
φ(0)θm(θ)=θm(θ). Finally, note that the separation rate is s(0) = λ if
t h e r ei sn oﬁring cost, while it is s(1) = λ/2 at the other extreme.
Substituting these functional forms into equation (6), the ﬁring cost level
chosen by the worker is given by F = r
2θγ which is of course a decreasing
relationship between ﬁring costs and the labor market tightness.
4 Job creation
We now derive the job creation condition, that is the demand side of the
model. Recalling the free entry condition V =0and making use of equation
(4), the job creation condition is:
[r + s(F)]c
φ(F)m(θ)
= y − w − s(F)F (9)
This equation states that the cost of creating and maintaining a vacancy in
equilibrium must be equal to the proﬁts the ﬁrm expects to obtain from the
4job once created, equal to the operating proﬁts net of the (expected) ﬁring
costs.
The sign of the relationship between of the F and θ for job creation may




[r + s(F)]φ(F)m0 (θ)c
m(θ)c
s(F)φ(F)
F [ φ (F) −  s (F)] + [φ(F)m(θ)]
2 s(F)[1−  s (F)] − m(θ)crφ
0 (F)
(10)
where  s (F)=−F
s0(F)
s(F) and  φ (F)=−F
φ0(F)
φ(F) are the elasticities of the
separation and hiring rates.
Since m0 (θ) < 0, the sign of the derivative in (10) depends on the sign
of the denominator. As φ
0 (F) is negative, this sign depends on the par-
ticular functional forms assumed for s(F) and φ(F). The ﬁrst term in the
denominator depends on the diﬀerence between the separating and hiring
elasticities, while the second depends on the elasticity of separation being
greater or less than 1. Hence, the sign of the relationship between F and θ
as far as the job creation is concerned cannot be determined ap r i o r i .T h i s
indeterminacy raises the possibility of multiple equilibria.
An example may help ﬁx ideas. Consider the functional forms used above.
As for the hiring rate, the elasticity of is  φ (F)= F
1−F, which is increasing
in F and is zero if ﬁring costs are equal to zero. As for the separation rate,
the elasticity is  s (F)= F
1+F:i ti se q u a lt oz e r oi fﬁring costs are zero and
it is decreasing in F. Substituting these functional forms in (10) gives a
decreasing relationship between F and θ for the job creation.
Intuitively, the sign of this relation can be understood if we remember that
the job creation must satisfy equation (9). When θ increases, the expected
cost of maintaining a vacancy increases since it has now become more diﬃcult
to ﬁll it. This implies a decrease in proﬁts. Since condition (9) states that in
equilibrium proﬁts must be equal to zero, the increase in θ should be followed
by a decrease in F. This is because, given the functional forms, the decrease in
F reduces both the expected ﬁring costs (since
ds(F)F
dF ≥ 0, so that  s (F) ≤ 1)
and the expected cost of creating and maintaining a vacancy decrease (since
 φ (F) ≥  s (F)).
5 Multiple equilibria
Three equations describe the equilibrium: the job creation condition (9), the
ﬁring cost function implicitly deﬁned by the insider ﬁrst order condition (6)
and the Beveridge curve.
5figure 1





These equations determine the equilibrium values of θ, F and u.N o t e
that the ﬁrst two equations form an independent subset from which we ob-
tain the equilibrium values of the labor market tightness and of ﬁring costs.
Plugging these two values into the Beveridge curve, we get the equilibrium
unemployment rate. Figure 1 illustrates a situation with two equilibria.
Note that equilibrium A is characterized by a high level of ﬁring costs and
lesser market tightness, while equilibrium B features a low level of ﬁring costs
and a high level of marked tightness. We can interpret the two equilibria as
reﬂecting two diﬀerent characteristics of the labor market. The endogeneity
of ﬁring costs implies that when the labor market is thin (the level of labor
market tightness is low), the average duration of a ﬁlled job 1
s(F) is high
(because ﬁring costs are high), but the average duration of unemployment
1
θm(θ) is also high . When, on the other hand, the labor market is thick (the
level of labor market tightness is high), the average duration of a ﬁlled job
is low but the worker has a high duration of a ﬁlled job (because ﬁring costs
are low) but also a high probability of ﬁnding a new job when unemployed.
Given the two equilibrium values of F and θ, we derive the equilibrium
unemployment level from the Beveridge curve.
Which are the implications and the meaning of these multiple equilibria?
The most remarkable thing to consider is about the Pareto eﬃciency.
6Consider ﬁrst the situation of the worker. In equilibrium A,i ft h ew o r k e r
is unemployed she has to bear a higher unemployment duration (because θ is
low). If instead she is employed, the average duration of a ﬁlled job is greater.
This is because the dismissal cost is high, thus giving rise to a reduction of
the separation rate. In B, the worker has a lower unemployment duration,
but also a lower stability of her job.
From the ﬁrm’s point of view, in equilibrium A it has a high probability
to cover a vacancy, but at the same time it also has a high level of the ﬁring
cost to pay. In equilibrium B we have a symmetric situation. In B,t h eﬁrm
pays a lower dismissal cost, but it has to wait longer to cover a vacant job.
Hence, we have two symmetric structures of the labor market, with two
equilibria which ap r i o r iare not rankable on the basis of Pareto eﬃciency
considerations. A rigid labor market can produce results similar to a ﬂexible
one. This is because the strictness of the EPL is determined by the labor
market tightness; in turn, this is inﬂuenced by the EPL,b u ti ta l s oa ﬀects
the choice of the insider.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that, if the ﬁring cost aﬀects hirings
and ﬁrings, the two equilibria can potentially produce similar unemployment
rates. Thus, diﬀerent labor market conﬁgurations may give rise to not too
much diﬀerent unemployment rates.
6 Concluding remarks
Institutions change and evolve over time and space. In this paper, we ac-
count for such an evolution providing a theoretical microfoundation for the
relationship between EPL and the tightness of the labor market. On the
basis of this result we are able to study the macroeconomic implications for
unemployment equilibrium.
We have shown that the insider choice of the optimal level of ﬁring costs
gives rise to a decreasing ﬁring costs function. Moreover, diﬀerent conﬁgura-
tions of the labor market deriving from the optimal behavior of the economic
agents give rise to multiple equilibria: prolonged average duration of unem-
ployment will produce a labor market with low ﬂo w sa n dw a g e sa n dm a r k e d
strictness of employment protection. Vice versa, short duration in the un-
employment status will produce high ﬂo w sa n dw a g e sa n dl o wl e v e l so fﬁring
costs.
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